Attorneys often rely on court filings, public records, and docket materials when building arguments on behalf of their clients. Because these documents are publicly accessible, it can be easy to assume they are also freely available for reuse. A recent federal court decision serves as a reminder that public access and copyright ownership are not the same thing.

In May 2026, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia denied motions to dismiss three copyright infringement lawsuits brought by jury consultant Lindsay Olson against several attorneys and their law firms. While the case has not yet reached a final resolution, the court’s decision allows the lawsuits to move forward and highlights important considerations for anyone using copyrighted materials that appear in public court records.

The Background

Lindsay Olson, a Texas-based jury consultant, was hired in 2022 to prepare a jury-attitude report for attorneys representing defendants in the January 6 criminal proceedings. The resulting report analyzed potential juror bias and was later filed on a public court docket in support of motions to transfer venue.

After the report appeared on the public docket, several other defense attorneys downloaded and attached the same report to venue transfer motions filed on behalf of their own clients. According to the lawsuits, these attorneys did so without obtaining Olson’s permission.

Later that year, Olson registered the report with the U.S. Copyright Office. In 2025, she filed copyright infringement lawsuits against the attorneys and their respective law firms. The cases were eventually consolidated for pretrial and trial purposes.

Does Public Access Eliminate Copyright Protection?

One of the key arguments raised by the defendants was that members of the public have a constitutional right to access, review, and distribute documents filed in court proceedings.

The court acknowledged that judicial records are generally accessible to the public. However, it emphasized that the right of access is not unlimited and does not automatically eliminate intellectual property rights.

In denying the defendants’ argument, the court pointed to prior decisions recognizing that copyrighted works can remain protected even when they appear in public court files. The court reasoned that simply making a work available through a public docket does not destroy the copyright owner’s property interest in that work.

According to the court, ruling otherwise could undermine copyright protection for countless creative works that may be filed in litigation, including photographs, books, films, songs, and other materials.

What About Fair Use?

The defendants also argued that their use of the report qualified as fair use under the Copyright Act.

Rather than deciding the issue at this stage, the court determined that the fair use defense involved factual questions that could not be resolved through a motion to dismiss. The court noted that important facts remained disputed, including whether the copying was primarily intended to educate the court or whether it had a commercial purpose.

Because fair use often requires a detailed examination of the specific circumstances surrounding a use, the court concluded that dismissal would be premature and allowed the claims to proceed.

Why This Decision Matters

The Olson decision highlights a risk that may not always be obvious. The fact that a document appears on a public court docket does not necessarily mean it can be copied and reused without consequence.

The case also demonstrates that a work may still be protected even if it does not contain a copyright notice. In this situation, the report did not include a copyright notice when it was originally created and filed. Nevertheless, Olson later registered the work with the Copyright Office and pursued infringement claims based on its alleged unauthorized use.

For attorneys and others working with publicly available materials, the decision serves as a reminder that copyright considerations should not be overlooked simply because a document is accessible online or through a court record.

Practical Takeaways

The court noted that alternatives to wholesale copying may have been available. According to the opinion, parties could potentially have referred the court to the original docket entry or cited specific portions of the report rather than filing complete copies.

When considering the use of another person’s work, obtaining permission from the copyright owner may also be an option. Exploring alternatives before reproducing a complete work can help reduce the risk of potential infringement claims.

Final Thoughts

Although the Olson litigation is still ongoing, the court’s decision provides an important lesson about the relationship between public records and copyright law. Accessibility does not automatically eliminate ownership rights, and publicly filed materials may still receive copyright protection.

As this case continues to develop, it serves as a reminder that careful consideration of intellectual property rights remains important, even when the work in question can be found on a public court docket.

Before a patent owner can pursue an infringement lawsuit, it must clear a threshold that has tripped up more than a few plaintiffs: Article III standing. As the Federal Circuit explained in Morrow v. Microsoft Corp. (2007), Article III of the Constitution limits the courts to resolving actual “cases” and “controversies,” and the standing inquiry enforces that limit. If standing is absent at the start of litigation, dismissal is mandatory and that defect cannot be cured. The wasted litigation costs and lost tactical advantages that follow make the issue far more than an academic one.

The question grows more complicated when a patent owner has licensed its rights to someone else. On May 19, the Federal Circuit issued two decisions, one precedential, one not, that clarify when rights a licensor retains in an exclusive license agreement (ELA) are sufficient to preserve Article III standing. Both decisions offer practical guidance for anyone drafting or negotiating a patent license.

The A.L.M. Decision: Clearing Up a Longstanding Confusion

In A.L.M. Holding Co. v. Zydex Indus. Pvt. Ltd., the plaintiffs jointly owned six patents covering asphalt paving methods and compositions and had licensed them to Ingevity Corporation under an ELA. Ingevity received a broad worldwide license to manufacture, sell, and commercialize licensed products. But the patent owners retained meaningful rights: a shared right to pursue infringement litigation, veto authority over any sublicensing by Ingevity, and a royalty interest on any sublicensee sales. When the plaintiffs sued Zydex for infringement, the district court dismissed the case, finding those retained rights insufficient for standing. The Federal Circuit reversed.

On appeal, the court acknowledged candidly that its own “standing jurisprudence has not always been clear.” Courts had long conflated two distinct concepts: Article III (constitutional) standing and statutory standing under 35 U.S.C. § 281, creating real confusion for litigants and district courts alike. The Federal Circuit used A.L.M. to draw a clear line between them.

Constitutional standing requires a concrete injury in fact, causation, and redressability. Statutory standing asks whether the plaintiff is a “patentee” who holds “all substantial rights” in the asserted patent. The distinction is critical in practice: a constitutional standing defect is jurisdictional and incurable, while a statutory standing defect can be fixed by joining the necessary parties. A plaintiff can satisfy Article III without satisfying the stricter “all substantial rights” test.

The Federal Circuit also clarified that even though the two inquiries are distinct, the same facts that bear on statutory standing can inform the constitutional analysis, specifically, whether the patent owner’s retained enforcement rights are genuine or effectively illusory. A right to sue is illusory, the court explained by example, when a licensee can unilaterally grant a royalty-free sublicense to an accused infringer without the patent owner’s consent, thereby extinguishing the owner’s practical ability to enforce.

Applying those principles, the Federal Circuit identified three rights that, taken together, confirmed the plaintiffs had Article III standing: a retained right to sue, sublicensing veto authority (even if that veto could not be unreasonably withheld), and a royalty interest tied to sublicensee sales. Because Ingevity could not sublicense the patents without the plaintiffs’ consent, their right to enforce remained real and enforceable, not illusory. The dismissal was reversed.

The Recor Decision: Secondary Enforcement Rights Are Enough

In Recor Med., Inc. v. Medtronic Ireland Mfg. Unlimited Co., the Federal Circuit reached the same conclusion on materially similar facts, though with one notable wrinkle.

Medtronic Ireland owns two patents relating to kidney treatment devices and had licensed rights in those patents to Medtronic Galway under an April 2023 ELA. Medtronic Galway received the first right to pursue infringement litigation. Medtronic Ireland retained a secondary right to sue if Medtronic Galway declined to act, along with royalty interests and veto authority over sublicensing and assignments. When Recor Medical challenged Medtronic Ireland’s standing to bring an infringement counterclaim, the district court sided with Recor. The Federal Circuit reversed.

Unlike A.L.M., Medtronic Ireland did not hold the primary right to initiate infringement suits. The Federal Circuit held that this was not dispositive. Once Medtronic Galway chose not to pursue a claim, Medtronic Ireland’s right to sue became fully operative and unfettered, giving it complete control over the litigation. That secondary-but-unconditional right, paired with royalty interests and sublicensing veto authority, was enough.

The Recor decision also highlighted an unusual ELA provision: Medtronic Galway could only hold exclusionary rights over products that Medtronic Ireland had specifically designated as “Products” under the agreement. That gatekeeping authority, the court observed, gave Medtronic Ireland ongoing control over the scope of the license itself, further confirming that its retained rights were substantive rather than nominal.

What This Means for Patent License Drafting

A.L.M. relaxes, and clarifies, the standards for establishing Article III standing in patent infringement cases. By permitting the facts underlying the statutory “all substantial rights” analysis to inform the constitutional inquiry, the court gives patent owner-licensors a clearer roadmap: retain a genuine right to sue, a meaningful veto over sublicensing, and a royalty interest tied to downstream sales.

These decisions do not ease the burden of satisfying statutory standing, but that matters less given that a statutory defect can be cured through joinder. In Recor, Medtronic Ireland had moved to join Medtronic Galway as a necessary party, and the Federal Circuit directed the district court to take up that motion on remand.

For patent owners entering into exclusive license agreements, the lesson is straightforward. Licensing is not an all-or-nothing proposition, and the rights you retain define your ability to enforce. Drafting those provisions carefully, and with these decisions in mind, can be the difference between a lawsuit that proceeds and one that is dismissed before it begins.